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Peter McCormick*

Duets, Not Solos: The McLachlin Court's
Co-Authorship Legacy

This article explores the recent phenomenon of the formal co-authorship of Supreme
Court decisions. It begins with a short history of the practice, primarily in the
closing years of the Lamer Court but expanding steadily under McLachlin. A closer
investigation reveals two critically important dimensions: first, the practice is skewed
toward the Court's more important decisions (measured in terms of subject matter
legal complexity, interveners, and subsequent citation); and second, its diffusion
across the Court's membership refutes the possibility that it simply reinforces
persisting cleavages. This new practice represents a more overtly collegial format
directed to the Court's more significant decisions. At the same time, however it
diffuses traditional judicial accountability anchored in the solo attribution of reasons
for judgment. In conclusion, the article suggests that the emergence of the coauthorship style should be seen as a new "thirdphase" in the historical evolution of
the Court's judgment-presentationstyle.

Cet article examine le phenomene recent de la cosignature officielle des decisions de
la Cour supreme. II commence par un bref historique de la pratique, principalement
au cours des dernieres annees de la Cour Lamer mais elle prend de I'ampleur sous
McLachlin. Une enquete plus approfondie revele deux dimensions d'une importance
critique : premierement, la pratique est biaisee en faveur des decisions les plus
importantes de la Cour (mesurees en termes d'objet, de complexite juridique,
d'intervenants et de citations ulterieures); et deuxiemement, sa diffusion parmi les
membres de la Cour refute la possibilite qu'elle renforce simplement des clivages
persistants. Cette nouvelle pratique represente une avenue plus ouvertement collegiale
pour les decisions les plus importantes de la Cour. En meme temps cependant, elle
diffuse la responsabilite judiciairetraditionnelle ancree dans I'attribution a une seule
personne des motifs d'unjugement. En conclusion, 'articlesuggere que I'emergence
de ce style de copatemite devrait etre consideree comme une nouvelle , troisieme
phase - dans I'evolution historique du style de presentation des arrets de la Cour
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Introduction
Why two? More specifically, why two judges jointly co-authoring the
reasons for judgment in a Supreme Court decision, rather than the more
normal attribution to a single judge that has long been the Canadian practice
and continues to be routine in comparable common law countries?
But two is what we now often find. As a recent example: on 26 July
2017, in Clyde River (Hamlet)v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc,1 the Supreme
Court handed down an important decision dealing with the constitutional
and treaty rights of an Inuit community in Nunavut. The central issue was
the National Energy Board's authorization of seismic testing for oil and
gas, and the question was whether the government's duty to consult with
the relevant Aboriginal groups, and the opportunity of such groups to
participate in the approval process, had been adequately met. Reversing

1.

Clyde River (Hamlet) vPetroleum Geo-Services nc, 2017 SCC 40, [2017] 1 SCR 1069.
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the decision of the Federal Court ofAppeal, the Supreme Court found that
the duty to consult had not been satisfied, and it quashed the authorization.
In the process, it significantly clarified the procedural implications of the
constitutional duty to consult, such that the decision has implications that
go far beyond the immediate case.
This was a unanimous decision of a nine-judge panel, and the 6500word judgment of the Court was delivered by Karakatsanis and Brown. But
why "Karakatsanis and Brown"? Why not "Karakatsanis" or "Brown"?
Until recently-I will later in this article be more specific about how
recently-we would have expected and always received a set of reasons
attributed to a single justice (the unusual and comparably recent practice
of "By the Court" aside). The modem Court has made it clear that this
is now qualified by a "circulate and revise" process that makes the final
decision something of a collegial product.2 But in Clyde River, without
any explanation, the attribution is to a pair of judges.
Nor, as this article will demonstrate, is this particularly unusual these
days-the decision in a companion case handed down the same day was
also co-authored by this same pair ofjudges.3 And the next day the reasons
for judgment in a completely unrelated case were jointly authored by
Wagner and Gascon, with jointly authored separate concurring reasons by
Brown and Rowe .4And a day later, there was another completely unrelated
case, again with a judgment jointly authored by Wagner and Gascon. That
is five sets of co-authored reasons in three days, four of them judgments,
embracing three different pairs ofjudges who together make up a majority
of the current members ofthe Court. This is something more than a casual
aberration; it is on the way to becoming routine, but a routine that has been
little noted.
So, to return to the opening query, why two judges? What is there
about the particular case, or the current personnel of the Court, or the
former Chief Justice, that makes this recent novelty so routine that none of
the media reports even mention it? And how does it fit in with the Court's
own descriptions of its decision-making procedures, described in outline

2.
See Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada,2003 SCC 45, at para 92, [2003] 2 SCR 259.
3.
Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge PipelinesInc, 2017 SCC 41, [2017] 1 SCR
1099.
4.
Quebec (Attorney General)v Guerin, 2017 SCC 42, [2017] 2 SCR 3 [Guerin].
5.
Uniprix inc v Gestion Gosselin etBerube mc, 2017 SCC 43, [2017] 2 SCR 59.
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in Wewayakum and clarified in a number of journal articles and books?6
Is the joint authorship the product of the initial judgment assignment at
the post-hearing judicial conference, or does it emerge from the circulateand-revise process that modifies a solo-judge initial set of reasons for
judgment? How common is it becoming? When did it begin, and how
likely is it to continue? And why does it matter-what does it tell us about
the Supreme Court's evolving sense of its own role and about the style of
self-presentation that is appropriate to such a role? This article will seek
to answer all these questions through an empirical investigation of the
Supreme Court's decisions.
This article is something more than a simple up-dating of a piece
written a decade ago that drew attention to the phenomenon. The tone
of that earlier article reflected the fact that it seemed to be describing a
practice in decline, that seemed to be becoming less frequent, presumably
because the two most prominent practitioners (Cory and lacobucci) had
both left the Court. The year in which that article appeared was the recent
low point for co-authorships of both decisions and minority opinions; as a
consequence, it ended a little plaintively. Having painted itself into the culde-sac of linking the practice to a specific handful ofjudges, and treating it
as a single bloc of cases rather than an emerging and evolving protocol, it
effectively reduced the phenomenon to a curiosity, and probably a passing
one at that.
The article that follows will present quite a different picture. The
frequency of co-authorships of both judgments and minority reasons is
very much on the rise-so much so that this article will focus entirely on
co-authored judgments and ignore their minority reason counterparts. Not
only are such cases more frequent, but their use is clearly tilted toward the
significant rather than the routine. lacobucci may be gone, but McLachlin
and LeBel carried the flag until a new lead practitioner of co-authorship
emerged in the person of Chief Justice Wagner. Co-authorship clearly
matters more than it did a decade ago, and much more than it did when it
first emerged two decades ago; the fact that it figures most prominently in
the participation of the more junior members of the Court suggests strongly
that it will matter even more in the future. The challenge is to explain why

6.

See, e.g., Bertha Wilson, "Decision-Making in the Supreme Court" (1986) 36:3 UTLJ; Ian

Greene et al,
FinalAppeal:Decision-Makingin Canadian Courts ofAppeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998);
Emmett Macfarlane, Governingfrom the Bench: The Supreme Court of Canada and the Judicial
Role (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012); Donald R. Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of
Canada:An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

7.

Peter McCormick, "Sharing the Spotlight: Co-Authored reasons on the Modem Supreme Court

of Canada" (2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 165 [McCormick, "Sharing the Spotlight"].
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this change is taking place. The double argument of the title is first, that
the major shift to the new practice of co-authorship occurred under former
Chief Justice McLachlin; and second, that the shift is important enough,
and fundamental enough, that it deserves to be identified as such.
I. Why does it matter?
The obvious question is-does this sort of change matter? In a number
of ways, it does not. The outcome of the case remains solid, regardless of
whether it was formally declared by a single judge, or by a duo ofjudges,
or anonymously attributed to "The Court." Similarly, the precedential
implications of the decision, of the way that it has dealt with the string
of legal questions that led up to that outcome, remains equally solid. Nor
does it make any difference to present or future litigants, and the way that
they make their decision to appeal and prepare their legal presentations.
Neither input or output has changed, but the way the Supreme Court
receives and processes the one so as to deliver the other has been constantly
evolving, and these changes do matter. When the Supreme Court began
holding regular post-hearing conferences in the early 1960s to move away
from the scattering of solo judgments, that mattered.8 When the Court in the
late 1960s stopped using the term "the judgment" for every set ofjudicial
reasons and reserved the term for the specifically labeled majority reasons,
that mattered. And when the Court in the 1990s developed a new singlepackage conversational judgment style, with the majority reasons drafted
first and minority reasons responding to them ("I have read the reasons")
in a focused way ("but cannot agree with respect to X"), that mattered as
well. 9 This current shift away from the solo-attributed accountability of a
specific member of the Court to shifting pairs and trios, and occasionally
and anonymously to the whole panel, is the latest stage of this evolution in
judicial self-presentation.
It matters all the more because the practice has become so pervasive,
such that the largely unnoticed shift has come to make up such a significant
portion of the caseload. It applies to all types of law, but especially to
constitutional cases (for the Charter, federalism, and First Nations law
alike) and public law cases. In recent years it has involved an increasing
share of the caseload, including a disproportionate share of the cases with
the most impressive citation tracks. It embraces all members of the Court,
but especially the more junior members who will dominate the Court for
8.

See Peter Hogg & Ravi Amarnath, "Why Judges Should Dissent" (2017) 67:2 UTLJ [Hogg &

Armanath].
9.
Peter McCormick, "Structures of Judgment: How the Modern Supreme Court of Canada
Organizes Its Reasons" (2009) 32:1 Dal U 35 [McCormick, "Structures of Judgment"].
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the next few decades. This important shift from individual judges to a
more deliberately institutional presentation will gradually but inevitably
change how we think and talk and write about the Court. We will find the
academic writings of the 1990's, with their cheerful attribution of the right
to counsel doctrine to Lamer, or the evolution of the framing of section 15
to L'Heureux-Dub6, or the Crown disclosure implications of "full answer
and defence" to Sopinka, strangely quaint. Only a much more nuanced
analysis will be capable of dealing with the subtleties of the constantly
shifting partnerships.
As one practical example: when the Supreme Court first tackled the
meaning ofthe Charter guarantee oftrial within a reasonable time inAskov,10
it was Cory who delivered the reasons and bore the brunt of the criticism
when the statistical basis of his reasons turned out to be flawed.11 But when
the Court revisited this same question in Jordan,12 laying down new and
stricter standards to an extent that caused consternation in the offices of
the various provincial attorneys-general, the reasons for judgment were
attributed not to any single member of the Court but rather to the trio of
Moldaver, Karakatsanis and Brown. Any praise or blame that flows from
this decision, and there has been a fair amount of both, will not be directed
to a single judge but rather be diffused among the three. The result of this
practice-indeed, perhaps the point of the change-is this deflection of
attention from a particular individual to the broader institution, and this is
why it is worth noting.
The style and format of presentation matters because they both reflect
and shape role and role perception. Let me make this point in terms of
recent current events. Within the last two years of the time of writing,
two U.S. Presidents have made public announcements about the issue of
transgender service in the armed forces. For the first of the two, Barack
Obama, the announcement took the form of an eloquent public statement,
clearly laying out the policy change, the reasons for it, and how and when
it would be implemented. For the second, Donald Trump, it came out of
the blue in the form of a cryptic middle-of-the-night Twitter feed. Put
aside one's judgment of the two individuals, put aside one's opinion of
the respective policies, even put aside the fact that Trump seems to have
blind-sided not only the general public but the Pentagon as well. Instead,
think about how Trump's Twitter tactics reflect a different conception of

10.

RvAskov, [1990] 2 SCR 1199.

11.

See Carl Baar, "Criminal Court Delay and the Charter: The Use and Misuse of Social Facts in

Judicial Policy Making" (1993) 72:3 Can Bar Rev 305.
12. R v Jordan,2016 SCC 27, [2016] 1 SCR 631.
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the role of the presidency, and of the relationship between the President
as leader and his supporters, and of how this interacts with the role of the
traditional news media. This is in part a matter of personality and personal
style, but it is also a question of dramatically different conceptions of
the Presidential role, of the nature of Presidential leadership, and of the
communication strategies that serve that new role. Role and message style
are a coherent package; changes in one require corresponding changes in
the other, and changes in technology impact both. And once such a change
has been made, there is no going back; future Presidents will be (will have
to be) more like Trump than Obama.
The changes to which I am drawing attention are less dramatic, and I
am not suggesting that any future Chief Justice will or should start using
their Twitter account in any comparable way. In their own way, however,
these changes are still very important in terms of the evolution of the
institution of the Supreme Court. Indeed, it is all the more important
because although the Supreme Court (and courts in general) have very
strong functional reasons for emphasizing tradition and continuity and
downplaying innovation, they are in fact adapting all the time to changes
in context and expectations. Like other such changes, they represent a
mixture of intention, aspiration and response, and this is a question I will
address in the conclusion.
I will proceed by dealing with a logical sequence of questions: First,
when did the practice of co-authorship begin? How far back does it go,
under what circumstances did it emerge, and which specific judges can
we connect with the innovation? Second, how often does it happen? Does
it happen often enough to merit attention, and is it trending up or down
or steady state? Third, which judges on the Court have been the most
active participants in the practice, and how concentrated is co-authorship
behavior? Is it limited to a small segment of the judges signing on with
each other, or is it more widespread? Does it identify persistent subsets
of judges dividing on a series of issues, or do the partnerships span the
Court? Fourth, how significant or insignificant are the general run of
cases for which it is deployed? Are we looking at significant decisions
with real precedential implications, or the more routine decisions that will
cast a negligible shadow across the citation tracks? Fifth, how does the
co-authorship phenomenon fit into the decision-making process that the
Court has several times described to us-that is to say, does it emerge
from the initial post-hearing judicial conference, or is it a subsequent
accommodation to the way that other members of the panel respond
critically to a solo-authored first draft? Sixth, what is co-authorship all
about? What might the reasons be for a recent trend toward more explicit
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collaboration within an established institution? What might we learn from
the consideration of parallel developments in related fields such as the
legal academic journals? Seventh, where is this taking us? Does it link
with other recent developments in the practices of the Supreme Court?
What will the future Court look like if these tendencies persist? If this
practice reveals to us a way that Chief Justice McLachlin has presided
over a major and enduring change to the way that the Supreme Court of
Canada handles its business and presents itself-and that is indeed my
contention-then what are the other aspects of the change and where is it
taking us?
As preliminary answers: the practice is recent, dating back at most
two decades; it happens increasingly often, and although we can identify
the most likely originator of the practice it now pervades the whole Court;
it is being used for an increasing number of the Court's most objectively
important decisions; it is "built in" to the judgment-assignment process;
and it is part of a package of changes that takes us toward a more
institutional and less individualized (a "de-heroized") vision of the Court.
The following pages will vindicate these claims.
II. The modest (apparent)beginnings: the Dickson Court
There were four co-authored decisions delivered by the Dickson Court,
two of which involved a panel which included the Chief Justice. Those
four decisions were:
" John v. The Queen, [1985] 1 SCR 476 (per Estey & Lamer)
" Labrosse v. The Queen, [1987] 1 SCR 310 (per McIntyre, Lamer & La
Forest)
" Irwin Toy Ltd v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 (per
Dickson, Lamer & Wilson)
" R v. Sparrow [1990] 1 SCR 1075 (per Dickson & La Forest)
At first glance, this looks like a convincing if modest beginning to
an emerging practice. It starts tentatively, with two comparatively minor
decisions-both are very short decisions by minimum-size panels, and
neither has ever been subsequently cited by the Supreme Court. The
second half of the short list is much more impressive. Irwin Toy is still the
definitive first statement of the meaning of freedom of expression under
the Charter, and R v. Sparrow provided a comparable first statement of
the Court's approach to the meaning of section 35 of the Constitution Act
1982 guaranteeing Aboriginal rights.
A closer look erodes this appearance. Labrosse v. The Queen looks
instead like a failed attempt at a brief "By the Court" decision. On a
five-judge panel reduced to four by the death of Chouinard, three judges
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dismiss the appeal in about three hundred words, while the fourth (Beetz)
contributes a terse single sentence agreeing with the conclusion of his
colleagues; this seems to me to carry overtones of "agree with the outcome
but not with the reasons" because otherwise there seems no point to the
self-separation. Because of the combined effect of the poor health of a
number of its members and an unusually steady turnover of personnel,
the Dickson Court had atypical problems maintaining its normal routine
("panel of four" is already problematic), and this decision seems less to
signal "new practice" than "somewhat frantic makeshift."
The same seems to be true of the considerably more significant
decision in Irwin Toy. The seven-judge panel had been reduced to five by
the retirement of Estey and the medical incapacitation of Le Dam, and the
five-judge panel split between a three-judge majority and a much shorter
two-judge (Beetz and McIntyre) dissent. But the initial appearance of a
sharp division on the Court over the meaning of an important Charter
section is misleading; the dissenters have no problem with the content
of this robust judicial statement about freedom of expression. Their
disagreement instead is about whether the Quebec legislation that violates
that right can be saved by invoking section I's "reasonable limits," and they
differ from the majority by holding that it cannot. That is to say: this case
as well has the appearance of a unanimous "By the Court" decision that
went sideways at the last moment, but under considerable time pressure
(oral argument having taken place eighteen months earlier). Once again,
then, this looks less like "new practice" than "convenient makeshift."
Sparrow finally looks like a more convincing candidate, a unanimous
decision of a seven-judge panel (reduced to six by the retirement of
McIntyre) attributed to the Chief Justice and La Forest. However, Dickson's
biographers present a different back story.13 They report that at the judicial
conference, La Forest was assigned the writing of the judgment, but his
initial draft was received with serious reservations, especially by the
Chief Justice and Justice Wilson. Sharpe and Roach describe Dickson as
"fashioning the judgment" so as to bridge the gap between La Forest's
restrained deference and Wilson's considerably more robust approach.
La Forest acquiesced in the redrafting, and some elements of the reasons
reflected his more cautious approach. Although Wilson reportedly
believed the judgment should have gone out under Dickson's name alone,

13.

Robert J Sharpe & Kent Roach, Brian Dickson: A Judge s Journey (Toronto: University of

Toronto Press for the Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2003) at 448-543 [Sharpe &
Roach].
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the courtesy ofjoint attribution was adopted. Again, this makes it difficult
to see this case as a deliberate start to a new practice.
What we are left with is the single anomalous minor case of John v.
The Queen, a single co-authored concurrence in Germain v. R,14 and a
single co-authored dissent in R v. Green. 5 This is not much of a start to a
possible new decision-making protocol.
III. The first (real)emergence: the Lamer Court
The Lamer Court is a more convincing candidate for initiating the new
practice, with 25 co-authored judgments in ten years. There were two early
examples. The first was BG Checo"6 in January of 1993, dealing with the
tort of negligent representation; the majority decision was delivered by
La Forest and McLachlin. The second, fourteen months later, was RJR7
Macdonald"
dealing with the question of the process and standards for an
application for interlocutory relief (as distinct from the Charter challenge
to regulatory legislation that would be dealt with separately and later);
the unanimous decision was co-authored by Sopinka and Cory. Both were
decisions of above average length, and both have been cited more than a
dozen times, refuting in advance any suggestion that the co-authorship
reflects a decision that is deemed minor or routine. More noteworthy
perhaps are the four co-authored decisions by Sopinka and lacobucci
in 1995, three of which were companion cases"8 handed down on April
13, 1995 dealing with the right to silence and the question of compelled
testimony. 9 The fourth, in November 1995, was Khela,2' again a majority
decision by Sopinka and lacobucci, dealing with the Charter issue of
Crown disclosure. There was a single co-authored decision in 1996,
namely Hawkins21 where a majority decision by Lamer and lacobucci
dealt again with the question of witness compellability. Then a pair of coauthored decisions in 1997: Curragh2 2 a majority decision by La Forest
and Cory involving the apprehension of bias on the part of a trial judge;

14.
15.
16.
17.

Germainv The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 241 (per Dickson& Lamer).
R v Green, [1988] 1 SCR 228 (per Estey & Lamer).
BG ChecolnternationalLtdvBritishColumbia Hydro and PowerAuthority, [1993] 1 SCR 12.
RJR-MacDonaldInc v Canada(Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311.

18. That is to say: cases dealing with similar or overlapping issues, assigned to the same panel of
judges, with oral argument on the same or sequential days, with judgments delivered on the same day,
and typically with parallel sets of judgments and minority reasons authored by the same individuals;
they are often cross-referenced in the text of the decision
19. British Columbia Securities Commission v Branch, [1995] 2 SCR 3; R v Primeau, [1995] 2 SCR
60; andR vJobin [1995] 2 SCR 78.
20. RvKhela, [1995] 4 SCR 201.
21. R vHawkins, [1996] 3 SCR 1043.
22. R v CurraghInc, [1997] 1 SCR 357.
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and Dynar, 3 a majority decision by Cory and lacobucci in an extradition
case. This latter is noteworthy as the first example of a Cory-and-lacobucci
co-authorship, a partnership that for several years dominated the emerging
practice. Several of these co-authored decisions have been of lasting
significance; for example, there was Vriend2 4 on sexual orientation and the
Charter, Gladue25 on sentencing principles for First Nations, Corbiere26 on
equality rights, and M v. HF on the rights of same sex couples under the
Charter.
But this description risks begging the "new practice" question:
these sporadic examples are interesting, but even as they very gradually
accumulate they are too scattered to constitute anything that can realistically
be described as a "practice." The important transition only comes about in
1998, with no fewer than ten examples in that year (more than the total
over the previous seven years), and six in 1999. Co-authorship is therefore
not a regular feature of the Lamer Court, but rather a practice that emerged
only in the closing years of that Chief Justiceship.
One might have thought that Sopinka's participation as the senior
member in five of the first six examples of co-authorship marked him
as a significant player in the emergence of the practice, but in fact that
blossoming of co-authored reasons at the end of the Lamer Court happened
only after Sopinka's death in late 1997. The two individuals who can be
singled out as being at the centre of the development were lacobucci (with
16 co-authorships) and Cory (with 10). There were only five co-authored
decisions for the Lamer Court that did not include either Cory or lacobucci,
a number which is smaller than the six that these two wrote together. Seven
other judges were also involved to some degree, most notably McLachlin
(6 co-authorships), Bastarache (also 6) and Sopinka (5).
Only five ofthe Lamer Court co-authorships were unanimous decisions,
but this was not as noteworthy for the more fragmented Lamer Court as
it would have been for the McLachlin Court. In terms of subject matter,
twelve of the 25 were constitutional cases (11 Charter, one federalism),
three were public law, and the remainder was evenly divided between
criminal and private law cases. Many were of substantial length; 13 were
10,000 words or more, and half of those were over 20,000 words. It is
the packing of this new style of judgment-delivery at the end of the Chief

23.
24.

United States ofAmerica v Dynar, [1997] 2 SCR 462.
VriendvAlberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493.

25.

R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688.

26.
27.

Corbierev Canada(MiisterofIndian and NorthernAffairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203.
MvH, [1999] 2 SCR 3.
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Justiceship that justifies talking about the emergence of a new practice,
and it is the McLachlin Court that delivers on this new expectation.
IV. The fruition: the McLachlin Court
I have suggested that Cory and lacobucci were at the core of the flurry of
co-authored decisions in the last two years of the Lamer Court; but Cory
reached retirement age six months before Lamer retired as Chief Justice,
which opened at least the possibility that the flurry would be self-contained.
The truth was quite different-the practice of co-authorship did not falter,
but continued at a sustained level, even after lacobucci himself left the
Court in the middle of 2004. As of 31 July 2017 (when data collection
for this paper ended), the McLachlin Court had delivered no fewer than
121 co-authored decisions. This amounts to about seven such decisions a
year; this seems slightly below the numbers for 1998/9, but because the
Lamer Court averaged 75 reserved judgments a year and the McLachlin
Court only 60, the more accurate observation is that co-authorship has
been consistently higher in proportional terms for the McLachlin Chief
Justiceship than for even the closing years of its predecessor.
Because the ten dozen decisions are an awkwardly large total, and
because the extended length of the McLachlin Chief Justiceship makes it
problematic to treat them as a single block, I will divide my description
of this evolution into three different periods: early, middle and late. But
because my periodization is derived from the practice itself, rather than by
the arbitrary creation of strictly equal sub-periods, I will label each period
in terms of the most significant co-authoring individuals as the lacobucci
period, the McLachlin/LeBel period, and the Wagner period.
V. The Jacobucciperiod (2000 2004)
lacobucci has already been identified as a significant player in the emergence
of the practice of co-authorship. This combined with his continuing high
profile in the practice justifies suggesting a first period that is defined by
his own service on the Court, ending with his retirement in 2004. There
were 37 co-authored decisions over these five years, or about 7.5 a year;
the only real low point was the initial year of 2000, when there were only
two such decisions; the peak year was 2002 with 11.
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Citation

Co-authors

Arsenault-Cameronv PEI

2000 SCC 1

Major & Bastarache

Martel Building Corp. v Canada

2000 SCC 60

Jacobucci & Major

Spire Freezers v Canada

2001 SCC 11

Jacobucci & Bastarache

Backman v Canada

2001 SCC 10

Jacobucci & Bastarache

Trinity Western U. v B.C.

2001 SCC 31

Jacobucci & Bastarache

Proulx v Quebec (AG)

2001 SCC 66

Jacobucci & Binnie

Cooper v Hobart

2001 SCC 79

McLachlin & Major

Edwards v Law Society

2001 SCC 80

McLachlin & Major

R v Golden

2001 SCC 83

Jacobucci & Arbour

RWDSUv Pepsi-Cola

2002 SCC 8

McLachlin & LeBel

R v Cinous

2002 SCC 29

McLachlin & Bastarache

Housen v Nikolaisen

2002 SCC 33

Jacobucci & Major

Stewart v Canada

2002 SCC 46

Jacobucci & Bastarache

Walls v Canada

2002 SCC 47

Jacobucci & Bastarache

CIBC Mortgage v Vasquez

2002 SCC 60

L'Heureux-Dube & Gonthier

Krieger v Law Society

2002 SCC 65

Jacobucci & Major

B v Ontario HRC

2002 SCC 66

Jacobucci & Bastarache

R v Jarvis

2002 SCC 73

Jacobucci & Major

R v Ling

2002 SCC 74

lacobucci & Major

Prud'homme v Prud'homme

2002 SCC 85

L'Heureux-Dube & LeBel

Miglin v Miglin

2003 SCC 24

Bastarache & Arbour

Bell Canadav CTEA

2003 SCC 36

McLachlin & Bastarache

R v Edgar

2003 SCC 47

Jacobucci & Arbour

R v Smith

2003 SCC 48

Jacobucci & Arbour

R v Johnson

2003 SCC 46

Jacobucci & Arbour

R v Kelly

2003 SCC 50

Jacobucci & Arbour

R v Mitchell

2003 SCC 49

Jacobucci & Arbour

Doucet-Boudreauv NS

2003 SCC 62

Jacobucci & Arbour

R v Clay

2003 SCC 75

Gonthier & Binnie

R v Malmo-Levine

2003 SCC 74

Gonthier & Binnie

R v Lyttle

2004 SCC 5

Major & Fish

Monsanto v Schmeiser

2004 SCC 34

McLachlin & Fish

Re Vancouver Sun

2004 SCC 43

Jacobucci & Arbour

Re Application

2004 SCC 42

Jacobucci & Arbour

R v Demers

2004 SCC 46

Jacobucci & Bastarache

Cabiakmanv IndustrialAlliance

2004 SCC 55

LeBel & Fish

Peoples DepartmentStores

2004 SCC 68

Major & Deschamps
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lacobucci clearly remains the center of the phenomenon, personally
participating in 22 of the 37 co-authored decisions, about 60%. Arguably,
the four most significant co-authored decisions were Proulx (on civil
liability for malicious prosecution), Housen (on standards of review),
Doucet-Boudreau (on Charter remedies) and Malmo-Levine (on
fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charter); the first three of these
involved lacobucci. There was also a visible "second tier" of participating
justices (Major, Bastarache and Arbour, all with 10), but there was no
"non-lacobucci" partnership that occurred with any frequency.
The center of gravity of the practice was Charter cases, of which there
were a full dozen; there were also eight public law, and eight private law
cases. The low number was for criminal cases, of which there were only
six, and five of those were a single set of companion cases by lacobucci
and Arbour in 2003.
What is striking is the relative absence of Quebec judges. On the
basis of simple probabilities, for any set of nine individuals divided into
subsets of six and three, there are 36 different pairs that can be generated
(conveniently close to the actual number of 37 for this period), and three
of these will involve only individuals from the small set. This precisely
predicts the actual set of three co-authored decisions by a pair of Quebec
judges, which were also the only three judgments that were written in
French and then translated into English rather than the reverse. However,
this aside, the Quebec judges were not among the more active participants,
the five Quebec judges (Lebel from the start, then Deschamps and Fish
replacing Gonthier and L'Heureux-Dube) together accounting for less
than one-sixth of the total (that is, 12 of the 74 participants for the 37 coauthored decisions).
VI. The McLachlinlLeBel period (2004 2012)
I have identified the emergence of the practice of co-authorship with the
role of lacobucci; the important question is therefore what impact his
departure from the Court in late 2004 would have on that practice. The
surprising answer is: less than might have been expected. The frequency
of co-authored decisions is down somewhat (41 in the eight years, or
just over five a year, down by a third from the first four years), but the
frequency is still such that we can think of a nascent practice rather than
sporadic curiosities.
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Citation

Co-authors

CanadaTrustco v Canada

2005 SCC 54

McLachlin & Major

Mathew v Canada

2005 SCC 55

McLachlin & Major

Montreal v 2952-1366 Quebec

2005 SCC 62

McLachlin & Deschamps

May v FerndaleInstitution

2005 SCC 82

LeBel & Fish

CanadaHRC v CAILtd

2006 SCC 1

LeBel & Abella

Young v Bella

2006 SCC 3

McLachlin & Binnie

R v Gagnon

2006 SCC 17

Bastarache & Abella

Fidler v Sun Life Assurance

2006 SCC 30

McLachlin & Abella

Roberston v Thomson Corp

2006 SCC 43

LeBel & Fish

R v Morris

2006 SCC 59

Deschamps & Abella

Little Sisters v Canada

2007 SCC 2

Bastarache & LeBel

Double NEarthmoves

2007 SCC 3

Abella & Rothstein

Canadav Hislop

2007 SCC 10

LeBel & Rothstein

Canadian Western Bank

2007 SCC 22

Binnie & LeBel

BC v Lafarge Canada

2007 SCC 23

Binnie & LeBel

Health Services & Support

2007 SCC 27

McLachlin & LeBel

ABB Inc v Domtar Inc

2007 SCC 50

LeBel & Deschamps

Dunsmuir v NB

2008 SCC 9

Bastarache & LeBel

Charkaouiv Canada

2008 SCC 38

LeBel & Fish

R vKapp

2008 SCC 41

McLachlin & Abella

Redeemer Foundation

2008 SCC 46

McLachlin & LeBel

R v Illes

2008 SCC 57

LeBel & Fish

St Lawrence Cement

2008 SCC 64

LeBel & Deschamps

R v Suberu

2009 SCC 33

McLachlin & Charron

R v Grant

2009 SCC 32

McLachlin & Charron

R v Shepherd

2009 SCC 35

McLachlin & Charron

R vHurley

2010 SCC 18

Rothstein & Cromwell

CriminalLawyers Assoc.

2010 SCC 23

McLachlin & Abella

R v Sinclair

2010 SCC 35

McLachlin & Charron

R v Willier

2010 SCC 37

McLachlin & Charron

R vMcCrimmon

2010 SCC 36

McLachlin & Charron

Withler v Canada

2011 SCC 12

McLachlin & Abella

Ontario v Fraser

2011 SCC 20

McLachlin & LeBel

R v Katigbak

2011 SCC 48

McLachlin & Charron

CanadaHRCv CanadaA-G

2011 SCC 53

LeBel & Cromwell

RP v RC

2-11 SCC 65

Abella & Rothstein

LMP v LS

2011 SCC 64

Abella & Rothstein

Richardv Time Inc

2012 SCC 8

LeBel & Cromwell
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2012 SCC 16

Moldaver & Karakatsanis

EntertainmentSoftware Assoc

2012 SCC 34

Abella & Moldaver

Opitz v Wrzesnewskyj

2012 SCC 35

Rothstein & Moldaver

R v Tse
Rv Tse

The two most frequent participants are now McLachlin (18 examples)
and LeBel (16), closely followed by Abella with 11. Where lacobucci was
involved in 60% of the co-authorships for 2000-2004, McLachlin and
LeBel were each involved in only about 40% of the co-authorships for
2005-2012, which is to say that the practice is now spread among a wider
set of the justices, to such an extent that every member of the Court was
involved at least once. There were only two co-authorships that paired
McLachlin and LeBel, which means that although (at least) one of them
took part in fully three-quarters of the co-authorships, they did so on an
"either/or" basis rather than together. The involvement of Quebec judges
was significantly higher. They accounted for 30% of the total (that is to
say, 24 of the 82 participants for the 41 co-authored decisions); six of those
decisions were delivered by a pair of Quebec judges, and four of those
were initially written in French. However, this was almost entirely due to
LeBel, who alone accounted for two-thirds of this increasing Quebec role.
The centre of gravity of co-authored decisions was still constitutional
law-fourteen Charter cases, and three others on constitutional law
including one (Morris) on Aboriginal rights. The most significant of
this string of decisions are arguably Dunsmuir (on standards of review),
Canadian Western (on the federal/provincial division of powers), the
sequential decisions in Kapp and Withler (on the basic framework for
assessing equality claims under the Charter), and BC Health Services and
Fraser (part of the string of cases dealing with freedom of association
under the Charter). All of these involved either CJ McLachlin or LeBel,
and two (BC Health and Fraser)involved both.
VII. The Wagner period (2013 2017)
The use of co-authored decisions has more recently shifted upward
in a pronounced way, and the appointment of Justice Wagner has been
a significant element in this shift. With 43 examples in four and a half
years, co-authorships now account for an average often decisions a year,
and this at a time when the Court hands an average of about 60 reserved
judgments a year. Just as much to the point, the number of these decisions
is not "steady state" but clearly increasing year by year. It is also striking
that within the last year there have also been a number of three-judge coauthorships, rather than the two-judge pairings that have been the case
until then.
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Citation

Co-authors

R v Ryan

2013 SCC 3

LeBel & Cromwell

ManitobaMetis Federation

2013 SCC 14

McLachlin & Karakatsanis

Ediger vJohnston

2013 SCC 18

Rothstein & Moldaver

Penner v NiagaraRegional Police

2013 SCC 19

Cromwell & Karakatsanis

Ezokola v Canada

2013 SCC 40

LeBel & Fish

Marine Services International

2013 SCC 44

LeBel & Karakatsanis

Infineon Technologies

2013 SCC 59

LeBel & Wagner

Alberta v UFCW

2013 SCC 62

Abella & Cromwell

R v McRae

2013 SCC 68

Cromwell & Karakatsanis

Fivendi CanadaInc

2014 SCC 1

LeBel & Wagner

Bernardv Canada

2014 SCC 13

Abella & Cromwell

R v Hutchinson

2014 SCC 19

McLachlin & Cromwell

Ontario v Ontario

2014 SCC 31

Cromwell & Wagner

Canadav Confederation

2014 SCC 49

LeBel & Wagner

Marcotte v Federation

2014 SCC 57

Rothstein & Wagner

Bank of Montreal v Marcotte

2014 SCC 55

Rothstein & Wagner

AmexBankvAdams

2014 SCC 56

Rothstein & Wagner

R v Conception

2014 SCC 60

Rothstein & Cromwell

Imperial Oil v Jacques

2014 SCC 66

LeBel & Wagner

Meredith v Canada

2015 SCC 2

McLachlin & LeBel

Mounted Police Assn

2015 SCC 1

McLachlin & LeBel

Quebec v Canada

2015 SCC 14

Cromwell & Karakatsanis

Hinse v Canada

2015 SCC 35

Wagner & Gaston

Quebec v Bombardier

2015 SCC 39

Wagner & Cote

Guindon v Canada

2015 SCC 41

Rothstein & Cromwell

Caron vAlberta

2015 SCC 56

Cromwell & Karakatsanis

Saskatchewan v Lemare Lake

2015 SCC 53

Abella & Gascon

World Bank Group v Wallace

2016 SCC 15

Moldaver & Cote

Heritage CapitalCorp

2016 SCC 19

Gascon & Cote

Canadav Chambre des notaires

2016 SCC 20

Wagner & Gascon

Canadav Thompson

2016 SCC 21

Wagner & Gascon

Rogers CommunicationsInc

2016 SCC 23

Wagner & Cote

R v Williamson

2016 SCC 28

Moldaver, Karakatsanis & Brown

R v Jordan

2016 SCC 27

Moldaver, Karakatsanis & Brown

Lafortune v Financiere agricole

2016 SCC 35

Wagner & Gascon

Ferme VI-Ber v Financiereagricole

2016 SCC 34

Wagner & Gascon

Conference desjuges de paix

2016 SCC 39

Karakatsanis, Wagner & Cote

Morasse v Nadeau-Dubois

2016 SCC 44

Abella & Gascon
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Douez v Facebook Inc

2107 SCC 33

Karakatsanis, Wagner & Gascon

Clyde River v PG-SInc

2017 SCC 40

Karakatsanis & Brown

Chippewas v Enbridge

2017 SCC 41

Karakatsanis & Brown

Quebec v Guerin

2017 SCC 42

Wagner & Gascon

Uniprix v Gestion Gosselin

2017 SCC 43

Wagner & Gascon

The focus of the cases was primarily on constitutional cases with a
total of 16 (nine of which were Charter cases). There were ten decisions
involving public law and 13 on private law matters, but only four for
the criminal law decisions that make up a substantial share of the total
caseload. Arguably, the more significant cases included Lemare Lake (on
paramountcy in relation to the federal/provincial division of powers),
Mounted Police (on freedom of association), Jordan(on the Charter right
to trial within a reasonable time) and Clyde River (on Aboriginal rights
and the "duty to consult").
The most active member of the Court in terms of co-authorship was
Wagner with a total of eighteen; he was followed by Karakatsanis (with
12), Cromwell (11) and Gascon (10). The only member of the Court who
had not been part of a co-authorship during the period described is the
most recent appointee, Rowe, although he has co-authored a separate
concurrence 28 and a dissent; 29 more recently, outside the data-collection
period, he has also co-authored a decision.3" It is also worth noting
that although the Chief Justice was the most frequent participant in coauthorships between 2005 and 2012, this is definitely not true of the next
five years where her four co-authorships are already matched by Justice
Brown, who was only appointed two years ago.
The Wagner period is characterized by a modest but significant tilting
toward the Quebec judges, with the one-third of the judges from Quebec
accounting for one-half of all co-authorship partnerships. Sixteen decisions
involved co-authorships by a pair of Quebec judges, and ten were initially
written in French. This represents a steady and significant evolution of the
practice in terms of the balance between Quebec and non-Quebec judges.
Initially, during the lacobucci period, the participation of Quebec judges
was very limited, barely half of what their notional share of the Court's
membership would have suggested. During the McLachlin/LeBel period,
Quebecjudges were 33o%of the membership and 30% of the co-authorship
partnerships, although much of this was due to a single judge, namely

28.
29.
30.

Google Inc v Equustek SolutionsInc, 2017 SCC 34, [2017] 1 SCR 824.
Guerin, supra note 4.
Canada (Attorney General)v Fontaine,2017 SCC 47 [2017] 2 SCR 205.
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LeBel. But during the Wagner period, Quebec judges are one-third of the
Court but one-half of the partnerships, and although Wagner is the leading
actor in this respect he accounts for well under half of all the Quebec judge
participation. Concomitantly, the share of co-authored decisions written in
French is up from one in ten for both the earlier periods to one in four for
the Wagner period.
VIII. Assessing frequencies
The most obvious way to assess the frequency of co-authored decisions
over time is, of course, simply to count the number of such decisions a
year, which is much what I have been doing in the previous section. But
this is potentially misleading, because the number of reserved judgments
vanes considerably, not just from the ten year average of 75 a year for the
Lamer Court to the 60 a year for the McLachlin Court, but from year to
year within a Chief Justiceship. For the McLachlin Court, for example, the
highest number of reserved judgments handed down was 76 in 2001; the
lowest was 42 in 2016. The longer-term decline between the Lamer and
McLachlin Courts may well reflect broader structural changes that deserve
attention; the year to year fluctuations clearly do not, because they can
depend on the complexity of the actual cases being dealt with, and on the
availability of the justices which can be affected either by poor health or
by new appointments with the implication of a transitional period.
In order to correct for this variability, I suggest flipping the perspective
from which to examine the co-authorship phenomenon. Rather than
counting cases from the outside, I will count panel appearances from
the inside. Specifically, the reserved judgments for any given year can
be recalculated in terms of panel appearances (excluding those flagged in
the Supreme Court Reports as "Did Not Participate"); so the 76 reserved
judgments in 2001 involved a total of 592 panel appearances, the 42
reserved judgments in 2016 only 339.
Every panel appearance can then be coded as resulting in one of six
possible choices, three each down two different tracks. If the judge in
question is part of the majority they could write solo reasons (subject of
course to "circulate and revise"), or they could co-author reasons with one
or more colleagues,31 or they could sign on to reasons that are attributed to
another judge or judges. Similarly, if the judge is involved in a dissent or

31. For immediate purposes, I am treating participation in a "By the Court" judgment-of which
there were a number-as a form of co-authorship, although my immediate attention is on the two- or
three-judge variety of those collaborations. For a consideration of the history and evolution of the
"By the Court" phenomenon, see Peter McCormick, "'By the Court': The Untold Story of a Canadian
Judicial Innovation" (2016) 53:3 Osgoode Hall LJ.
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a separate concurrence, they can either solo-write these minority reasons
(which may or may not be joined by one or more colleagues), or they
can co-author those reasons, or they can sign on to the minority reasons
attributed to another judge or judges. For present purposes, it is the first
two of these six that I will consider: if you were a judge on the McLachlin
Court, approaching a case for which you had been assigned to the panel,
what is the likelihood that you would be part of the judgment-writing
conclusion of the Court's consideration of the case, and what is the relative
likelihood of that participation being solo or shared?
Figure1. LikelihoodofPanelParicipationResuting in Authorship, by year
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The year to year fluctuations are considerable, but do not obscure the
gradual closing of what started as a very wide gap. What initially drives
the "solo decision" line, of course, is the panel size, which has gradually
been tracking upward for the last thirty years, but that should only bring
it down to about 12% (the average panel size for the McLachlin Court
hovering around 8), and it has been below that number for almost all of
the last 20 years. But, because the year-by-year fluctuations have been
considerable, the numbers have been recalculated on the basis of five year
running averages in the next figure (which therefore has to drop the first
and last pair of years from the chart).
The running-averages chart conveys the same message in even clearer
terms: in terms of "what is this panel appearance going to result in?"
calculations for the average Supreme Court justice, it is increasingly likely
that the result will be a co-authorship rather than a solo authorship, to such
an extent that the two lines converge for the most recent terms. In tabular
form:
Years

Solo Decision

Co-decision

Ratio

Lamer 1

1990-1994

14.5%

3.6%

25%

Lamer 2

1995-1999

13.0%

5.2%

40%

lacobucci Period

2000-2004

10.8%

6.8%

McLachlin/LeBel Period

2005-2012

10.7%

8.2%

1

75%

Wagner Period

2013-2017

9.7%

10.5%

1

110%

1

60%

Thirty years ago, at the beginning of the Lamer Court, there was some coauthorship (at least in the form of anonymous-unanimous 'By the Court'
decisions), but it was only a modest part of the Court's business; even with
the "everyone shares" element of 'By the Court,' it was still four times as
likely that a panel participation would result in a solo judgment assignment
than that it would result in co-authorship. By the end of the Lamer Court,
the balance had begun to shift slightly, but it was still two and a half times
as likely that a panel participant would be solo-writing reasons. The swing
continued and accelerated during the McLachlin Chief Justiceship. During
what I have termed as "the lacobucci period," the solo assignment of a
judgment was only half again as likely as a co-authorship, and during
the McLachlin/LeBel period, it was only a third again as likely. Most
dramatically, since (although not necessarily because of) the appointment
of Justice Wagner, it is slightly more likely that a panel appearance by
any justice will result in a co-authorship than that it will result in a solo
authorship. From the outside point of view of counting specific cases, this
is double (or triple, or in the case of By the Court judgments multiple)
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counting some cases, but from the inside point of view of a participating
judge, this is what the active caseload now looks like. Co-authorships are
no longer an occasional curiosity; they have become such a regular part of
what the Court does that both judges and outside observers must change
their thinking about what judicial participation looks like. Indeed, this is
already starting to happen. When the Lawyers Daily publishes its summary
annual evaluation of each of the judges on the Supreme Court, they do so
by identifying both the solo judgments and the co-authored judgments of
each justice on something of an equal basis.32 This is something that we
have to get used to, with the consequences that I will consider in a later
section.
IX. Major cases or minor cases?
The critical question, of course, is whether there is a pattern to the use
of co-authorship, and if so whether that pattern steers it toward the less
or the more important side of the caseload. In the previous section,
I have pointed out some of the more important cases, but this is an
impressionistic rather than a systematic approach, and therefore no more
than a first indication. How is one to objectively operationalize the idea
of "more important" in terms of the Supreme Court caseload? I propose
several different approaches, playing up different aspects or dimensions of
decision importance.
The first dimension is subject matter-that is to say, the type of law
that is being addressed by the case in question. The Supreme Court keeps
track of its cases as being divided into two different categories, criminal
and civil, but this seems too blunt a division for present purposes. My
own preference is for a four-category division of cases-constitutional
law, public law, private law and criminal law-which has the added
convenience of creating four roughly equal segments of the reserved
judgment caseload. Reflecting my own research and teaching interests as
a political scientist who teaches courses on constitutional law, I would
suggest that this four-way division above is also in some respects an order
of importance in terms of the impact of the cases within each set. The table
indicates the number of reserved judgments for each of these four sets of
decisions, divided in terms of whether they were "By the Court," 'joint
judgment" or "solo judgment" decisions.

32. See, e.g., "Karakatsanis played a major role for the court" (16 February 2017) The Lawyer's
Daily (Lexis), online: <www.thelawyersdaily.ca/articles/3347>.
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BTC

joint

solo

Total

BTC %

Joint%

Consitutional

21

48

204

273

7.7%

1 . %

74.7%

Public

11

27

178

216

5.1%

12.5%

82.4%

Private

7

31

252

290

2.4%

10.7%

86.9%

7 6

Solo%

Criminal

17

15

253

285

6.0%

5.3%

88.8%

Total

56

121

887

1064

5.3%

11.4%

83.4%

Constitutional law cases are clearly the most likely to draw either joint
or "By the Court" decisions, half again as much as for the caseload as a
whole, such that fully one quarter of all constitutional law cases no longer
reflect the solo-judge authorship style that until recently was the Supreme
Court's norm. Public law cases are also slightly more likely than average
to involve a form of joint authorship, but private law cases are less likely,
and criminal cases much less likely, to do so. In terms of type of law, then,
the joint decision caseload is clearly and strongly tilted toward the more
important cases.
Constitutional law in this century is of course something of a threering circus, the three being Charter law, federalism/division of powers
cases, and First Nations law. Does this differentiation point to differing
likelihoods ofjoint decisions?
Type

BTC

joint

solo

Total

BTC%

Joint%

Solo%

Charter

13

36

149

198

6.6%

18.2%

75.3%

Federalism

6

8

35

49

12.2%

16.3%

71.4%

First Nations

2

4

20

26

7.7%

15.4%

76.9%

Total

21

48

204

273

7.7%

17.6%

74.7%

As the table shows, the use of By the Court decisions, which are also
more common for constitutional law cases than for other types of law,
is clearly tilted toward the constitutional law of federalism, where it is
almost twice as likely as for other types of constitutional cases. But coauthored decisions are relatively evenly spread across all three types of
constitutional law, to the point that we can (almost) say "plus or minus
IV' to describe the frequency for constitutional law generally and for
each of these three sub-fields.
The second dimension of case importance is legal complexity. Some
Supreme Court cases involve dealing with less-than-fully settled aspects of
the law, such that there is genuine uncertainty as to the optimal resolution
of the core legal issue and, correspondingly, differences among the
various judges who have addressed it. In a very theoretical sense, the most
desirable situation for a court system would be for all judges who look at
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a case to arrive at the same outcome, and this is what normally happens in
the Canadian judicial system: most trial decisions are not appealed, most
appeals are dismissed, and most appeal panel decisions are unanimous.
But if this is so, then it justifies looking more closely at those occasions
when one or more of these theoretically desirable circumstances did not
occur.
A Supreme Court decision is normally the third take on a particular
case, after an initial trial court decision and a further consideration by a
provincial or federal court of appeal. There are therefore four different
opportunities for this uncertainty to display itself.
" First, the court of appeal may allow the appeal; Hettinger et a133 refer
to this as "vertical dissent" dividing different levels of courts just as
"horizontal dissent" divides the panel of a particular appeal court.
" Second, the court of appeal may be divided in its decision.
" Third, the Supreme Court may allow the appeal from the court of
appeal.
" Fourth, the Supreme Court itself may be divided in its decisions.
This suggests a "complexity index" of four elements, each one of which
can be scored as a "0" or a "1," giving the index itself a range from zero to
four. At one extreme, a "0" is a case where unanimous panels of the court
of appeal and the Supreme Court itself dismissed the appeal and upheld
the trial court decision. This suggests a case of relatively low complexity,
operating against a background of such reasonably settled law that all
thirteen of the judges (one trial judge, three provincial or federal court
of appeal judges, nine Supreme Court justices) could agree on the legal
principles and their application. At the other extreme, a "4," we have a case
where both appeals were successful but neither succeeded in such a way
as to unite the panel, which suggests a considerable degree of uncertainty
as to the law and its application. There are also a number of cases (coded
below as "other") that do not involve this multi-stage appellate journey, a
combination of federal or provincial reference questions on the one hand
and per saltum appeals direct from a provincial superior trial court on the
other.
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BTC

Joint

Solo

Total

BTC%

Joint%

Solo%

11

11

9

119

9.2%

9.32%

81.5%

1

12

37

256

305

3.9%

12.1%

83.9%

2

19

50

284

353

5.4%

14.2%

80.5%

3

6

15

192

213

2.8%

7.0%

90.1%

4

0

3

38

41

0.0%

7.3%

92.7%

Other

8

5

20

33

24.2%

15.2%

60.6%

Total

56

121

887

1064

5.3%

11.4%

83.4%

0

The pattern of results does not suggest that joint decisions (or their By
the Court counterparts) are disproportionately tilted toward the more
complex cases, but neither does it support the counter-hypothesis that the
co-authorship judgment presentation mode is used for the least complex
cases. The highest proportion ofjoint decisions is directed to the middle of
the scale, dropping off on both sides.
The third dimension of caseload importance has to do with public
salience, and I would suggest that a useful indicator in this regard is
interveners-not simply the question of whether there are interveners or
not, but how many different actors have chosen to intervene. Just over half
of the Supreme Court's reserved judgments drew at least one intervener,
but many of those drew only one or two interveners while at the other
extreme only one case in 12 involved ten or more different interveners.
Interveners

BTC

Joint

Solo

Total

BTC%

Joint%

Solo%

None

24

34

363

421

5.7%

8.1%

86.2%

Few (1-2)

7

22

220

249

2.8%

8.8%

88.4%

Some (3-5)

7

35

144

186

3.8%

18.8%

77.4%

Several (6-9)

10

18

92

120

8.3%

15.0%

1 76.70o

Many (10+)

8

12

68

88

9.1%

13.6%

77.3%

Total

56

121

887

1064

5.3%

11.4%

83.4%

Again, the pattern of results does not at all support the hypothesis that
joint decisions are generally directed toward the less important (in this
case, less publicly salient) decisions. There is instead a strong support for
the counter-hypothesis that their use is tilted toward the less routine (that
is to say, more publicly salient) cases, especially if this is conceptualized
less in terms of the five blocks of increasing intervener presence than a
dichotomous distinction between the two-thirds of the cases with "none
or few" interveners on the one hand, and the one third with three or more
interveners on the other.
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The fourth dimension of importance has to do with judicial precedent
and judicial citation, the suggestion being that one meaning of "decision
importance" would be that these are the cases that are subsequently cited
more often by the Supreme Court itself Simply counting these citations
is not enough to make the point, because the playing field is not level
-decisions handed down in 2000 have had more time to accumulate
citations than those handed down in 2015. My solution is to rank the cases
in terms of subsequent citations a year-a decision that has been cited ten
times since it was handed down two and a half years before my cut-off date
of June 30, 2017 has a per year citation count of 4.0, and a decision from
2000 would have to have accumulated more than five dozen citations to
earn the same score. (Given that there is a steady and measurable attrition
to citation frequency for any set of decisions, this methodology actually
favors the more recent decisions-it is easier to achieve any "per year"
frequency for the first five years than for any longer period-but the impact
of this factor is reduced by the fact that the attrition rate for the McLachlin
Court is much lower than it was for previous Chief Justiceships.)
Cite Rank

BTC

Joint

Solo

Total

BTC%

Joint%

Solo%

No cites

21

15

159

195

10.8%

7.7%

81.5%

.01-.5/yr

22

38

373

433

5.1%

8.8%

86.1%

.51-1/yr

5

24

197

226

2.2%

10.6%

87.2%

1.01-2 yr

3

25

107

135

2.2%

18.50o

79.3%

>2/yr

2

14

29

45

4.4%

31.1%

64.4%

Total

53

116

865

103433

5.1%

11.2%

83.7%

The results are quite striking, and strongly support the hypothesis that
joint authorship is directed to the portion of the caseload that is more
important in terms of subsequent citation. The lowest proportion of joint
decisions, one in every fourteen, is for the 20% of cases that are never
cited; conversely, the proportion of joint decisions for the one-in-twentyfive cases that are cited more than twice a year is four times as great,
almost one case in every three.
On three of the four suggested dimensions of decision importance,
joint decisions stand out as making up a disproportionate share of the more
important decisions. Legal complexity, assessed in terms of disagreement
within and between the courts that considered any specific case, is the odd
one out; the highest levels of complexity correlate with a lower proportion

33.

Lower total because of exclusion of decisions between 1 January 2017 and 31 July 2017, none

of which had accumulated any citations as of the 30 June 2017 cutoff date for the database.
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of joint decisions. On the other three measures of decision importance,
however, joint decisions are clearly identified with the more important
cases. In terms of subject matter, joint decisions are significantly more
likely for constitutional law cases than for any other cases, and within
the rest of the caseload for public law cases rather than private law or
criminal law cases. In terms of interveners, a measure of public salience,
joint decisions are much less likely if there are none or few interveners,
much more likely if there are three or more interveners. And in terms of
citation importance, joint decisions are strongly over-represented in the
heavily-cited lists, making up almost one third of the handful of cases that
are cited more than twice a year.
The obvious conclusion is that jointly authored decisions are not only
increasing in number but are also doing so for a disproportionate number
of the more high-profile and significant decisions of the Supreme Court.
These are not decisions that do not matter; they are decisions that matter a
great deal. The diffusion of accountability for the writing of those decisions
is therefore something that has to be taken into account in terms of the
internal operations of the Supreme Court and the way that it is choosing to
present itself to litigants and to the public.
X. Co-authorshipand the decision process
As it appears in the Supreme Court Reports, a co-authorship simply
involves a judgment of the Court that has been delivered by the two
or (less often and only recently) the three co-authors listed in order of
seniority. The protocols for handling multiple authors differ from one
institution to another-for example, they vary from one discipline to
another in academia, although within any discipline they are usually quite
widely understood-but for judicial co-authorships, that protocol is strict
seniority without any hint as to whether one of those listed may have been
responsible for the early drafts or played an unusually prominent role in
the revision process.
As the Supreme Court and various judges have described it, the
current procedure for decision-making involves a post-hearing judicial
conference at which there is a one-after-the-other exchange of views
about the case they have just heard. On that basis, the general mood of
the panel is determined, and an assignment is made as to who will have
the responsibility of drawing up a first draft, which will then be circulated
among the panel members for comment. The immediate question is how
the new practice of co-authorship fits with this long-standing description
of the process, and there are obviously two distinctly different possibilities.
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The first possibility is that the basic practice remains unchanged,
but something during the circulate-and-revise process has occasioned a
shared attribution between the initial assignee and some other member
of the panel. This may involve (as Justice Bastarache once suggested in
a personal conversation) the possibility of a separate concurrence that
would erode the majority position, suggesting the desirability of the
original author and the potential defector working together to generate a
mutually acceptable position. Or it may involve (as former Chief Justice
McLachlin has suggested in a slightly different context) the initial author's
acknowledgement of a particularly useful or important contribution.34 Both
point to what might be called an accommodative co-authorship, which
would be a device to prevent the fragmented panels that were common for
the Lamer Court and which McLachlin has sought to avoid.
The second possibility is that the initial assignment of the majority
reasons can itself be to two or three judges. Nothing I have read in any of
the several descriptions of this process makes any suggestion of a "two
of us" assignment, but neither do they preclude it. Given the established
protocol, the co-authoring judges may have volunteered as a unit, or
35
the Chief Justice may have chosen to make the assignment that way.
Either way, my label for this is incipient co-authorship, and it represents
a deliberate shift in the way the decision delivery process is approached
from the beginning.
The methodology that might serve us in determining which of
these processes is demonstrated in the Court's co-authorship practice is
function word analysis. This proceeds from the observation that there is
in the English language a basic set of function words, which is to say the
pedestrian words like "the," 'and," .of," "to," .or," "but," .if'
and the
like. Everyone uses these words, and they make up a surprising proportion
of everything we write; 36 but different people use them in subtle but
consistently different ways, more of one and less of another. This is an
objectively accessible element of personal style that constitutes something

34.

See Tonda MacCharles, "Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin ready to write new chapter with

novel" Toronto Star (16 June 2017) [MacCharles].

35.

The descriptions that Supreme Court judges have given of the process mentionbothvolunteering

and Chief Justice assignment; it is not clear what the balance is between them.
36. The 44 function words that I have been using for this analysis account for about 40% of the

words used by any of the McLachlin Court judges in any of their reasonably long decisions.

Duets, Not Solos: The McLachlin Court's
Co-Authorship Legacy

507

of an individual textual fingerprint, and that can therefore be used to
37
identify the actual writer of a problematic text.
For present purposes, I have created a list of 44 function words, starting
with Rosenthal & Yoon's list but revising in the light of actual usage from
McLachlin Court decisions totaling some five million words.38 This is used
to generate a "Difference Score" that is the sum of the absolute values of
the differences between an individual judge's function word usage in a
broad set of single-authored judgments, and the function word usage of
the immediate decision. In an earlier article, I used this methodology to
identify the lead writer of many of the McLachlin Court's "By the Court"
(that is, anonymous and unanimous) decisions.
Two obvious problems have been anticipated by my methodology.
One is the "law clerk problem" and the somewhat sensitive issue of the
extent to which these individuals contribute to the writing of decisions; this
was what Bodwin, Rosenthal and Yoon were investigating in their article.
My solution has been to look only at the analysis section of the decisions,
on the assumption that whatever the clerks' involvement, it is less likely
for that section than for the more routine elements (background, facts,
lower court judgments, legislative provisions) of the reasons. A second is
the "quotation problem," given that judicial decisions often involve direct
quotations from the lower court decisions, from earlier decisions of their
own or other courts, or from academic sources. For some judges in some
decisions, these can make up as much as one quarter of the entire wordlength of the decision, and for the McLachlin Court as a whole the ratio
is one word in every six. To deal with this, such direct quotations were
deleted before word-counts were calculated.
Unavoidably, the double reduction-analysis section only, shorn of
direct quotations-leaves many of the co-authored decisions shorter than
would be necessary for confident analysis. If the function word list is
including words that are used only two or three or four times in a thousand,
then one needs several thousand words for the judicial writing style to
have the space to present itself There were only 34 cases for which the

37. One of the earlier examples of this approach was to penetrate the Federalist Papers to identify the
writer of the handful of non-attributed papers; see Frederick Mosteller & David L Wallace, Inference
and DisputedAuthorship:The Federalist (Reading, UK: Addison-Wesley, 1964). It has more recently

been applied to judicial decisions by Jeffrey S Rosenthal & Albert H Yoon, "Judicial Ghostwriting:
Authorship on the Supreme Court" (2011) 96:6 Cornell L Rev 1307, and by Kelly Bodwin, Jeffrey
S Rosenthal & Albert H Yoon, "Opinion Writing and Authorship on the Supreme Court of Canada"
(2013) 63:2 UTLJ 159.
38. For a more detailed explanation of the methodology, and a table of the list of words used for
this purpose, see Peter McCormick, "Nom de Plume: Who Writes the Supreme Court's 'By the Court'
Judgments?" (2016) 39:1 Dal LJ 77.
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twice-shortened word count was more than six thousand words, and they
are the only ones that will be considered in this section.
One final problem that cannot be finessed is the language in which the
decision was written (and the presentation format of the Supreme Court
Reports makes it clear which set of reasons reflects the initial language
of writing, and which is the official translation). The methodology cannot
realistically be applied to translations, which will almost certainly reflect
the stylistic preferences of the translator as much as those of the initial
writer. The cases that I will be considering in this section are therefore
drawn from the 103 co-authored decisions that were delivered in English,
not the 18 that were delivered in French.
One might wonder whether the fingerprints of initial authorship survive
the "circulate and revise" process of the modem Supreme Court, but the
answer to this question is an unqualified "yes." For the Dickson Court's
major "By the Court" decisions in Ford and Devine Le Dain was clearly
indicated as the initial author-but the Supreme Court Reports state that
Le Dain "did not participate" in the decision. Sharpe and Roach provide
the explanation: Le Dain wrote the initial draft, provoking major concerns
from other judges, but was subsequently hospitalized such that he could
not make the necessary extensive revisions. These were accomplished by
Lamer and Wilson, and the "did not participate" entry reflects the fact that
Le Dain could not sign off on the final draft.39 That is to say: even "major
revisions" by other judges did not erase Le Dam's stylistic fingerprints,
still visible in function word usage.
The basic point is simple: in the case of an accommodative coauthorship, where an initial author is accepting revisions from a colleague
to the extent that a co-authorship attribution becomes appropriate, the
function word patterns of the final product will be measurably closer to
those of the lead author than to those of the colleague. (To make the point
a little differently: the concern in the accommodating revisions will be
more the ideas expressed than the stylistic preferences guiding the precise
words with which those ideas are expressed.) In the case of an incipient
co-authorship, the collaboration has been built into the text from the
earliest stages, and this will be pervasively reflected in the writing style as
well. As a result, the function word patterns of the final product will reflect
this deeper partnership and will not point to either of the two as having
played the larger role. If the Difference Score for the co-authoring judges
is sharply different (such as Marcotte, where the difference score is 4.3%
for one of the pair, 5.9% for the other), this will be taken as indicating a
39.

See Sharpe & Roach, supra note 13 at 427-432.
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lead author and an accommodative process. Where there is effectively no
difference in the score (such as Grant, where the score is 5.06% for one
judge, 5.07% for the other), this will be taken as indicating a full incipient
collaboration.

XI. Lead authorshipfor co-authoredjudgments: the Iacobucciperiod
Case

Year

Co-authors

Lead writer?

Martel

2000

Jacobucci & Major

Yes

Golden

2001

Jacobucci & Arbour

Perhaps

Cinous

2002

McLachlin & Bastarache

No

Stewart

2002

Jacobucci & Bastarache

No

Housen

2002

Jacobucci & Major

No

RWDSU v Pepsi

2002

McLachlin & LeBel

Perhaps
No

Jarvis

2002

Jacobucci & Major

Doucet

2003

Jacobucci & Arbour

Yes

Miglin

2003

Bastarache & Arbour

No

Malmo-Levine

2003

Gonthier & Binnie

No

Peoples

2004

Major & Deschamps

No

Application

2004

Jacobucci & Arbour

No

Demers

2004

Jacobucci & Bastarache

No

There were 13 co-authored decisions during the "lacobucci Period" with
a reduced word count above 6,000 words. Two had a clear lead author
between the pair, and two others may have done so, but for nine of them
the function word analysis strongly suggested a balanced co-authorship.
Two or perhaps four were accommodative co-authorships; nine or perhaps
eleven were incipient.
XII. Lead authorshipfor co-authoredjudgments: the McLach/inlLeBel
period
Case

Year

Co-authors

Lead Writer?

Canada Trustco

2005

McLachlin & Major

No

May v Femdale

2005

LeBel & Fish

Yes

Hislop

2007

LeBel & Rothstein

No

BC v LaFarge

2007

Binnie & LeBel

Yes

BC Health Service

2007

McLachlin & LeBel

No

Canadian Western

2007

Binnie & LeBel

No

Dunsmuir

2008

Bastarache & LeBel

No

Grant

2009

McLachlin & Charron

No

Criminal Lawyers

2010

McLachlin & Abella

Yes
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Sinclair

2010

McLachlin & Charron

Yes

Withler

2011

McLachlin & Abella

Yes

Tse

2012

Moldaver & Karakatsanis

Perhaps

Opitz

2012

Rothstein & Moldaver

Yes

Similarly, there were thirteen co-authored decisions during the McLachlin/
LeBel period with a reduced word count above 6,000 words. Six of them
seem to have had a clear lead author, six did not, and one was uncertainan even split, then, but one that suggests that both accommodative and
incipient co-authorships were involved during these eight years.
XIII. Lead authorshipfor co-authoredjudgments: the Wagner period
Case

Year

Co-authors

Lead Writer?

Manitoba Metis

2013

McLachlin & Karakatsanis

No

Infineon

2013

LeBel & Wagner

Perhaps

Hutchinson

2014

McLachlin & Cromwell

No

Marcotte

2015

Rothstein & Wagner

Yes

Mounted Police

2015

McLachlin & LeBel

Perhaps

Guindon

2015

Rothstein & Cromwell

No

Caron

2015

Cromwell & Karakatsanis

Yes

Jordan

2016

Moldaver, Karakatsanis & Brown

No

There were only eight co-authored decisions in English during the Wagner
period with a reduced word-count above 6,000 words. For two of them,
the function word analysis strongly supported the idea that there was
a lead author; for four of them, the indication was of a more balanced
partnership; and for two, the results were uncertain.
Lead Author

Uncertain

No Lead Author

Total

Jacobucci Period

2

2

9

13

McLachlin/LeBel Period

6

1

6

13

Wagner Period

2

2

4

8

Total

10

5

19

34

On balance, for the entire Chief Justiceship, more than half of them seem
to have been the product of a balanced partnership-that is to say, they
were incipient co-authorships with collaboration on the writing from the
earliest stages. Only half as many show one of the collaborators to have
had a distinct lead role. Although some co-authorships may arise from the
circulate-and-revise process as a device for avoiding fragmented panels,
considerably more seem to have emerged from the post-hearing conference
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and the initial assignment of the responsibility for writing the majority
judgment. This is the more interesting, because the more structural, of the
two possibilities.
XIV. Why co-authorship?
I have demonstrated that co-authorship is a recent development for the
Supreme Court of Canada, that it is being employed increasingly often,
that it is focused on the more significant cases in the more important
parts of the caseload, that it is pervasive on the Court rather than being
restricted to some identifiable sub-set of its members, and that it has been
integrated into the judgment assignment process itself rather than being an
accommodative response to emergent differences. But this simply takes us
to the more fundamental question: why co-authorship?
It is worth noting that a shift away from single to multiple authorship
is a pervasive reality of contemporary academic publication. Ask any
major funding agency, and they will tell you that the new reality is less the
curiosity-driven single scholar than the research team or (better yet) the
multi-university research network.4" As Tom Ginsburg has pointed out in
a recent article, this is true of academic legal journals as well, and I will
draw on him for some ideas that might explain this trend. 41
A first possibility is that co-authorship is a response to the challenge
of expertise and specialization accompanied by intellectual attempts to
establish bridging theories. An article applying economic models to
the study of law will tend to be written by a team that includes at least
one economist and at least one law professor; anything else risks an
embarrassing gaffe and loss of credibility. There is of course an element
of specialization to the practice of law-all members of the Supreme
Court arrive with a solid background in a particular branch of the lawbut the tendency of Canadian courts, especially appeal courts, is toward
the English principle that "a judge is a judge" such that specialization is
something to be contained and diffused rather than entrenched.
A second possibility is, more generally, to enhance the acceptability
and status of the product: if one judge is impressive, then two or three are
even more so, and each may have greater credibility for some identifiable
part of the audience. This does not seem relevant to the Supreme Court,

40. In an interesting parallel: when Peter Mansbridge stepped down as the long-serving news anchor
for CBC news, he was not replaced by a new individual but (with considerable fanfare) by a rotating
team of four people. Although one can see pragmatic reasons for this change, it is nonetheless an
interesting parallel.
41. Tom Ginsburg, "Empiricism and the Rising Incidence of Coauthorship in Law" [2011] U Ill L
Rev 1785.
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all the more so with its trend toward larger Full Court panels and a wellpublicized "circulate and revise" procedure.
Athird is the notion ofa compensation for efforts. In an academic setting,
this can be linked to seniority and juniority: a junior assistant professor
may be willing to invest the time and effort to provide robust critical
feedback to a senior colleague without expecting formal acknowledgment,
but as that person becomes more established they are less likely to do so
without some recognition, such as co-authorship. Curiously, something of
the sort does seem to have been hinted at in McLachlin's recent interview,
where the co-authorship of 'By the Court' is presented as (sometimes)
having been a recognition of important critical response from one or
more of the other members of the panel. 2 At some point, an after-the-fact
reward gradually becomes a before-the-fact incentive. Although she was
not speaking directly of the two- or three-judge shared decisions I have
been looking at, it is not unreasonable to think that the same thing might
help to explain some co-authorships.
A fourth possibility might somewhat crassly be suggested as "sharing
the goodies" within a restricted universe of publication opportunities.
In academia, of course, this is linked to the grim maxim of "publish or
perish," but it also applies in some sense to the Supreme Court as well,
given a caseload that has been shrinking fairly steadily for several decades.
Presumably judges accept appointment to the Supreme Court with the
expectation of contributing usefully to the development of the law, and
writing critical suggestions for somebody else's reasons may not be a fully
satisfactory way of achieving this; co-authorship expands the opportunities
for such contributions to be openly acknowledged and recognized. An
alternative response might well be an increase in the number of minority
reasons, and I take note in this context of Bastarache's suggestion that at
least some of the McLachlin Court's early co-authorships represented a
successful attempt by the Chief Justice to limit the number of separate
concurrences. The concern is possibly all the greater because on the
Supreme Court's own account, seniority is a major element of the choice
between competing volunteers for solo lead authorship.
A fifth possibility (my own, not Ginsburg's) is that co-authorship
might reflect a response to the transition process. Serving on the Supreme
Court can be, even for experienced provincial court of appeal judges,
a significant challenge. As one judge put it to me, a provincial court of
appeal judge can take comfort from the fact that the Supreme Court is
there to pick up on possible errors, but the judges on the Supreme Court
42.

MacCharles, supra note 35.
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itself work without a safety net. One way to ease the transition is for a
recent appointee to co-author with a more senior colleague, and 22 of the
121 co-authorships are consistent with this.
A sixth possibility is the diminution or diffusion of credit or blame.
Whether or not this is the purpose ofthe shift to co-authorship, it is certainly
a consequence of it, and I will therefore be devoting the concluding section
to a consideration of its implications.
Conclusion
I would suggest that the best way to think ofthe rise of formal co-authorship
on the Supreme Court is to think of it in terms of a gradual but deliberate
and consistent move toward a less individualized and more institutional
self-presentation of the Supreme Court-in a phrase, the "de-heroization"
of the Supreme Court. It represents a conscious move away from a Court
that is characterized by individuals who can be seen as champions who
come to stand for a particular position or a particular point of view or
perhaps just a particular specialization; and a corresponding move toward
a more institutional view where several or many judges visibly collaborate
on a fully collegial position, such that outcome trends cannot easily (or
perhaps at all) be traced back to individual justices.
This has been true more generally of the way that McLachlin has
handled her own Chief Justiceship. Assessing her legacy following her
retirement, I have been struck by how many of the decisions that could
have been her individual legacy have instead taken the form of 'By the
Court' decisions or co-authorships. It is for this reason that I am treating
the established practice of co-authorship as her legacy, even though its
origins reach back into the Lamer Court.
Diffusing the responsibility for a set of reasons for judgment between
a duo (or a trio) of judges is of course not the same thing as spreading
it equally over the entire panel, but it is very much a step in the same
direction-that is to say, it carries us away from an emphasis on individual
reputation in favour of a less personal and more institutional form of selfpresentation. If we want to assess the contribution to the law that was
made by (say) former Chief Justice Brian Dickson, we would begin with a
consideration of all the sets of reasons attributed to his authorship during
his service on the bench. But if we want to know about the contribution to
the law that was made by (say) Justice Frank lacobucci, the parallel enquiry
would be complicated by the fact that literally hundreds of citations have
been made to dozens of decisions that Justice lacobucci co-authored with
half a dozen different colleagues, adding up to fully half as many citations
as those to his solo-authored reasons. How much of what we see on the
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page for any specific set of such reasons is lacobucci, and how much is his
co-author? How much is a joint product that is not quite the same as what
eitherjudge would have written alone, reflecting the fact that collaboration
involves cooperation and constraint? My earlier investigation of coauthorship identified this diffusion of authorial responsibility as one of
the problematic aspects of the practice, a consideration that becomes
even stronger as two-person-authorship begins to yield to three-personauthorship. It would be a mistake to think of this as only a minor aspect
of current judicial citation practices; a count of judicial citations by the
McLachlin Court shows that the only individual judge cited more often
than "Mr. Justice two (or three) of us" is the Chief Justice herself (but not
by much).44
The related development is the gradual disappearance of named
citations from the repertoire of the Court's explanatory practices. The
major weapon in the Court's persuasive arsenal is the citation of prior
judicial decisions, and recent decades have seen a steady increase in the
proportion of these citations that are to prior decisions of the Supreme
Court itself. Sometimes these citations provide the name of the specific
judge who wrote the reasons (and as noted above until recently all reasons
were attributed to a single specific individual), and sometimes they do not.
The Laskin Court identified the writing judge in such a way in 39.8% of
its citations; the Dickson Court did so for 44.5%, and the Lamer Court for

40.5%. For the McLachlin Court, this same figure has fallen by a third,
to 26.4%; even more to the point, it was 32.2% for the first five years of
the McLachlin Chief Justiceship, but only 20.4% for the most recent five
years. Again, it is entirely appropriate to identify McLachlin herself as a
leader in this process; during the first five years of her Chief Justiceship,
she named the cited judge in only 22.2% of her citations, which at the
time made her a lonely outlier by a considerable margin. During the most
recent five years, this proportion of named citations has dropped slightly
(to 19.2%), but this now puts her in the middle of the current set ofjudges,
which strongly suggests that the practice will survive her departure from
the Court.
Not all citations, of course, are of the same type. Some quote directly
from an earlier decision or discuss it at length, some simply involve pointing
to a single case as support for a particular statement or proposition, and
some involve an American "string style" of citation that can list half a
dozen or more cases to back up an idea. The proportion of all citations that
43.
44.

McCormick, "Sharing the Spotlight," supra note 7.
Comment based on research in progress, manuscript under review.
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involve direct quotation from the earlier judgment has not really changed
-it was 30.l1% for Lamer and 29.2% for McLachlin-but the likelihood

that a direct quotation will be attributed to a specific named judge has
fallen considerably. This happened 85% of the time for the Lamer Court;
it now (over the last five years) has fallen to marginally less than 50%
for McLachlin Court. And, compounding the point, the citation of a coauthored decision is only half as likely to include specific names than the
citation of a single-authored decision, even if a direct quotation is involved.
Citations are the way that the Court links its decision in the immediate
case to the Court's own past, and to a steadily increasing extent that is
being done in ways that point much less often to specific individual judges
(either from earlier courts or the current court) and much more often to an
institutional product-"in such and such a case, the Court decided" or "in
an earlier case, the Court said." To read a Supreme Court decision from
twenty five or thirty years ago was something of a historical survey of
the great individual names from the history of the Court-Duff and Rand
and Laskin and Dickson walked side by side with Lamer and Sopinka
and La Forest and lacobucci, and almost every judicial decision directly
referenced several of them by name. This is much less true of more recent
decisions, and although one can look up each case one to see which
historic great may have written those reasons, this is not at all the same
thing. Again, the swing is from individual reputation to institutional and
collective reputation, and although it may be gradual and not yet complete,
it has been persistent and cumulative.
This article has identified a significant shift in the way that the
Supreme Court has presented its decisions over the last two decades, and
specifically in the strong trend toward co-authored rather than singleauthored reasons for judgment.45 It has demonstrated that this practice is
primarily directed to constitutional decisions, that it now embraces every
member of the Court rather than some particularly collegial or dominant
core of it, that it involves an increasing number ofthe Court's most heavily
cited decisions, that it has evolved from a practice primarily of non-Quebec
judges to include both major segments of the Court, and that from the
point of view of individual judges it has become the most common way
of direct involvement in reasons for judgment. Combined with the abovedescribed shifts in citation practices, this represents a strong shift away
from the more individualized Court to which we have been accustomed
and toward a more institutional approach.
45. There has also been a comparable, if slightly less pronounced, parallel shift toward co-authored
rather than solo-authored minority reasons, both dissents and separate concurrences.
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My use ofjudges' names for the three periods (lacobucci, McLachlin/
LeBel, Wagner) reflects a label of convenience, and does not imply that
these individuals are the sole or even the major reason for the behaviour.
We must remember "Henderson's Law," which avoids prematurely
attributing to individual whim or idiosyncrasy changes in judicial
behaviour that may really (or at least also) be functional responses by the
institution as a whole to the challenges, threats and changing expectations
with which the Court is dealing at any given time.46 (Henderson was
writing specifically about changes in the frequency and style of dissents,
but the observation applies more generally.) It is the Court as an institution
whose behaviour is evolving. It is worth noting that these individuals are
to some extent "leading the way" at least in terms of sheer numbers, but
the phenomenon does not reduce itself to their writing choices, nor is it by
any means limited to them. All the current members of the Court have coauthored judgments or minority reasons; the phenomenon is not reducible
to a single specific judge (currently Chief Justice Wagner) co-authoring
more than any previous member of the Court (even lacobucci), but rather
characterizes the Court as an institution.
During its 140 plus years, the Court has undergone an important
evolution in the way that it presents its judicial decisions, and these should
very much be seen not as the product of happenstance or whim but rather
as a conscious response to the way that the Court and its relevant publics
understood its role and its relation to the law.
The first stage was the seriatim stage, which in its purest form involves
every member of the panel independently writing complete (and often
largely duplicative) reasons for their preferred outcome to an appeal,
those sets of reasons being accumulated to generate an outcome (appeal
allowed or appeal denied). Over time, the "every judge" aspect diminished
somewhat, 47 and Hogg points out that since the Chief Justiceship of
Anglin there was a deliberate attempt to contain the number of reasons
to some extent, 48 but the critical point is that all of these (even the ones
that wound up being dissents) were considered to be 'judgments" and all
were available as sources of precedent. As Gerhard puts it, it was not the
deciding Court that had the say as to what the precedential impact of its
immediate decision might be; rather, it was up to the judges on subsequent
Courts gradually to develop a shared understanding of what that precedent
46. See Todd Henderson, "From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of Dissent"
[2007] Sup Ct Rev 283.

47.

See Claire L'Heureux-Dube, "The Length and Plurality of Supreme Court of Canada Decisions"

(1990) 28:3 Alta L Rev 581.
48. Hogg & Amarnath, supra note 8 at 128.
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"really" was, and this understanding itself could evolve over time.49 Even
when there might have been a majority opinion on the panel, "in the
seriatim tradition, these opinions do not carry additional weight"5 such
that the solo reasons of other judges on the panel might very well have
greater precedential impact. If we find ourselves thinking of the majority
reasons as the "real" judgment, we are simply showing how strong is the
hold of the protocol that came next. Initially, almost all the decisions of the
Supreme Court took this full seriatim form, and it survived (particularly,
for example, for the Court's responses to reference questions from the
federal government) into the 1960s.
The second stage was the "single judgment" stage, which involved
a single set of reasons (almost always51) being identified as carrying the
special status that we now attach to a 'judgment," with the other (minority)
contributions being labelled as "reasons." We generally connect this shift
to the Chief Justiceship of Cartwright, who established the procedural
prerequisite to such a shift, namely a post-heating judicial conference to
determine the mood of the panel and to assign to a specific individual the
responsibility for attempting an initial draft. In its fullest form, which I
have described elsewhere, 52 all the minority reasons take the form of a
self-acknowledged response to those reasons for judgment ("I have read
the reasons"); more recently, the reasons for judgment themselves have
sometimes come to include a section which is itself a response to those
minority reasons.
What the rising practice of co-authorship suggests is that we are
entering a third stage, characterized by a strong shift from an individualized
to an institutionalized model, one that is quite distinct from the practices
of any comparable common law national high court. This co-authorship
is not incidental or occasional, but increasingly frequent and increasingly
targeted on the more important elements of the caseload. It will, over time,
change how we think about and talk about the Supreme Court and its
decisions, just as the shift from seriatim to single-judgment necessitated
such changes fifty years ago. That the Supreme Court has chosen not

49.

See Michael J Gerhardt, The Power of Precedent(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 62:

"There was, in effect, no precedent until a later majority declared what it was."
50. Rebecca Gill, "Consensus or Ambivalence: Why Court Traditions Matter," online (2011) SStV,
DOI <10.2139/ssrn.1881961>.

51. It is occasionally the case that a fragmented majority differs within itself to the extent that a
majority or plurality judgment cannot be identified; see for exampleR v Brooks, 2000 SCC 11, [2000]
1 SCR 237. At the other extreme, I have only found a single case that identified two non-identical

judgments, because two members of the panel had signed both sets of reasons; see Comiteparitairev
Potash, [1994] 2 SCR 406.
52. McCormick, "Structures of Judgment," supra note 9.
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to highlight this important change in its own practices makes it more
important, not less important, for us to take due notice of it.

